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Abstract – This paper is based on the hypothesis that digital
business can only be conducted once the necessary institutional
framework has been put in place. Trust – the cornerstone of all
business activity – is an indispensable prerequisite to such a
framework. This trust is created on the one hand by technology
and, on the other hand, by institutions such as banks. And trust
is one area in which the banks in particular – despite the threat
of disintermediation and their precarious position in the world
of e-commerce, brought about by services with such a
substantial information content – can tap a vast store of
marketing potential. The original reason why banks emerged
several hundred years ago was an attempt to mediate between
certain market imperfections and conflicts of interest. Banks
are, therefore, institutions whose position in society has been
built on precisely these imperfections. Accordingly, the banks in
today's digital economy will only be able to escape the threat of
disintermediation if they once again adopt the role of "business
enabler". They will be able to hold their own on the market only
if they assume the function of a "trust mediary". This
hypothesis derives from analyses of transaction cost theory, but
is also based on two empirically representative studies
conducted on the subject and which, given a conjoint analytical
approach, permit concrete market simulations to be derived.
From the point of view of Internet users, such simulations
describe the role of the banks as trust mediaries who will in
future operate in three dimensions: transformation, transaction
cost reduction and trust.
INTRODUCTION
The phenomenal pace of Internet development and the
transaction contents now made possible by innovative
technologies leave the Internet in its present form poised to
enter the digital economy. In this economy, the aim is for all
phases of a transaction (inquiry, contractual agreement and
processing) to be mapped to a single medium which
guarantees the necessary confidentiality, integrity, binding
legal nature and traceability. From a rational point of view,
the Internet will only take over from "real transactions" if it
either adds value for the user or significantly lowers the cost
of transactions.
An appropriate legal framework must, however, be flanked
by a broad mix of institutional/economic tools and technical
instruments whose primary goal is to engender trust in the
conduct of transactions and in transaction partners.
This paper begins by outlining the imperfections of electronic
marketplaces (chapter 1), from which the need to reduce
existing complexities will become apparent. Chapter 2 then
describes banks as a form of institution which, since their
very inception, have sought to do just this, but which now
find themselves in a very vulnerable position in the electronic
marketplace. For the banks themselves, therefore, the issue of
disintermediation dominates the current discussion. Chapter 3
goes on to deal with the need for trust, showing how trust
evolves and what impact it has. The empirical studies needed
to test the theory that "banks will become the business
enablers in e-commerce thanks to their role as a bearer of
trust" are presented in chapter 4. Finally, the notion of "trust
mediation" is introduced both as a concept to enable digital
business and as an orientational strategy for banks in the field
of e-commerce.
I. D IGITAL BUSINESS – A NEW CHALLENGE
A. The complexity of electronic markets
Contrary to the assumption that electronic marketplaces are
tending toward market perfection in the sense of the neo-
classical microeconomy, closer analysis of the peculiarities of
open electronic marketplaces reveals the existence of
imperfections (or frictions) which can be seen as a hindrance
to the digital economy:
1)  Inherent behavioural frictions: Given three
recognised forms of human behaviour – bounded rationality
[1], opportunism [2] and a limited ability to engage in
associative thinking in complex situations – human decision-
makers are unable to comprehend all the possibilities open to
them in the context of e-commerce.
2)  Inherent technological frictions: The open,
decentralised nature of the Internet means that the integrity of
every transaction – even a transaction between parties known
to each other and who have maintained a long-standing
business relationship – is exposed to threats from potential
intruders [3].
3) Frictions inherent in certain types of goods: On the
Internet, a large number of goods are progressing from being
goods bought on approval to goods bought on the basis of
experience and trust [4] – goods whose quality cannot be
verified in advance.
A crucial factor here is the asymmetric distribution of
information about transaction costs between all players in
open networks; this asymmetry is due essentially to the fact
that such marketplaces are not bound to any one physical
location or to any given time.  As a general rule, the greater
the asymmetry in information distribution, the greater the
tendency toward opportunistic behaviour and bounded
rationality. In other words, the less the transaction partner
knows about either the properties of goods and transactions
or the legal conditions by which they are governed, the
greater is the danger that individuals, as decision-makers of
last resort in e-commerce, will make suboptimal choices.
In summary, when they operate as players in the world of
electronic commerce, people pose a major and intrinsic threat
to the fairness of transactions owing to their limited cognitive
capacities and their inability to cope with complex decision-
making situations [5]. It follows that not even an "absolutely
secure" technology (which, in any case, is not feasible in
practical terms) can resolve this problem in isolation. Rather,
the said players need to be given a technology they can
readily cope with, and one which protects them from
potential dangers (resulting from their own actions) by using
institutional arrangements to warn them of such threats and
offer effective decision support. The objective here must be
to foster a sense of trust and security on the part of the users:
a trust in and substantiated by the technology placed in their
hands, supplemented by economic and legal tools designed to
reduce the inherent complexity of e-commerce transactions.
B. Effects of electronic commerce: disintermediation versus
intermediation by the banks
Networks and electronic marketplaces typically effect a
migration from hierarchic 1:1 relationships to market-like
n:m relationships, which juxtapose a number of  autonomous
suppliers and demanders and permit the "free" exchange of
goods and services within a given network. On the network,
information and communication (I&C) technology handles
the functions of coordination, cooperation and
communication between the relevant parties in digital form,
in (near) real-time and multilaterally.
Malone/Yates/Benjamin, who apply the transaction cost
theory to electronic communication, illustrate the effect of
lower transaction costs resulting from I&C technology [6].
More efficient transactions cut the cost of coordination,
thereby resulting in the vertical "de-integration" (and, hence,
disintermediation) of companies. On this basis, the following
effects of the use of I&C technology can be predicted,
whereby direct connectivity will cause the tasks and roles
performed by the various players to change:
1)  Integration effect: Concerns the integration of hitherto
separate subprocesses in electronic procedures;
2)  Substitution effect: Concerns the substitution of
previous transaction partners by alternative partners (usually
more suited to one's preferences);
3) Intensification effect: Concerns the intensification of
existing interactive relationships by means of an additional
(electronic) delivery channel;
4)  Knowledge effect: Concerns the global availability of
knowledge more or less in real time for all market players;
5)  Communication effect : Concerns the ability to access
and process information more quickly, at lower cost and in a
more distributed manner;
6)  Broker effect: Concerns the option which connectivity
affords to market players of establishing direct contact with
one another, without the need for a broker or intermediary.
This effect is also referred to as disintermediation.
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Figure 1: Changing functions in the value chain
The disintermediation argument, postulated above all on the
grounds of the increasingly widespread use of digital media
as a result of the lower coordination costs afforded by IT [7],
primarily affects industries whose products and services have
a high information content (e.g. banks, travel agencies, stock
exchanges).
In certain submarkets, this may render obsolete the practice
of brokering trades on behalf and for the account of third
parties, since end customers are now able to contact product
suppliers directly. As a result, (trading) functions such as the
reclassification of goods, adjustments to meet demand,
maintaining market equilibrium and the preparation of
physical assets are tasks no longer performed by classical
trading companies, but can instead be handled autonomously
by each and every transactor within the network. Equally, the
geographic venue of a trade, an important factor in physical
markets, loses its relevance; nor is the number of transactions
now bound by transaction costs associated with the physical
distance between the supply and demand sides. The
dependent transaction frequency thus takes on the nature of a
"flat line" [8]. Since the spatial dimension has effectively
been eradicated, monopolistic intermediaries "in the middle
of the market" cease to exist. The function of intermediaries
between original suppliers and end customers is thus being
transformed by links in the value creation chain such as
outsourcing, insourcing, creation and elimination (cf. figure
1). In the same way, the spatial intermediary function of
stationary brokers or dealers is rendered obsolete by direct
contacts between suppliers and consumers. Retail chains, too,
are being modified and, in extreme cases, reduced to a
minimalist 1:1 relationship.
Paradoxically, however, it is possible to adopt two opposing
lines of argument when using the transaction cost theory to
explain the organisational implications of digital business [9]:
1)  The falling cost of coordination strengthens market
forces, leads to de-integration and, hence, eliminates the
intermediaries between the supply and demand sides;
2) The falling cost of coordination makes it cheaper to
outsource (sub)processes and therefore reinforces
intermediate structures.
In an analysis of various scenarios for the transition from a
physical to an electronic market, it is striking to note that only
one of four possible scenarios leads to actual
disintermediation. In the other scenarios, the existing forms
of coordination are merely supported by electronic means. As
a result, existing intermediaries can consolidate their position
by arguing that the use of I&C technologies has made their
"internal" service provisioning more efficient (e.g. by
exploiting economies of scale and synergistic benefits), or by
providing add-on services that could not be rendered
(efficiently) in the absence of I&C technologies. It is even
conceivable that dedicated electronic intermediaries (known
as "cybermediaries") will emerge (e.g. direct banks). Here,
the critical factor will ultimately be the relative information
asymmetries that exist between the parties to transactions
[10].
Especially in the business-to-consumer sector, and even more
so in the case of products with a high information content, the
widespread use of digital media is indeed fuelling a tendency
toward disintermediation. Notwithstanding, the many and
varied frictions in these electronic marketplaces constitute
barriers that will militate against the "broker effect". These
barriers can be overcome by technological instruments on the
one hand and institutional arrangements on the other; a
mixture of the two will be indispensable. Even so, whether
the broker effect can be deemed generally valid for all
industries and both for the business-to-consumer and
business-to-business sectors is more than questionable.
II. B ANKS AS " BUSINESS ENABLERS "
IN IMPERFECT MARKETS
A. The function of the banks
Ever since their inception as a special form of financial
intermediary, banks have played a dominant role in the "real
world". The fact that they exist at all is ultimately the result
of information asymmetries or conflicts of interests between
the players on capital markets – asymmetries that are
intrinsically associated with deficits in the area of trust and
security. In the markets in which they operate, banks assume
the role of intermediary between the originating transactors.
Rooted in the complexity of the financial markets and in the
incompatible interests of the respective players, the key
transformation functions performed by a financial
intermediary can be subsumed under the following headings
[11]:
· Information requirements transformation
· Lot size transformation
· Term transformation
· Risk transformation
· Spatial intermediary function
The object of these transformations is to cut the cost of
transactions for the players concerned such that, based on the
underlying model theory, the bank would become obsolete if
two or more other players could conduct a transaction with
less frictional losses (i.e. with lower transaction costs) than
the bank, or if the transaction costs were lower than the fees
charged by the bank for the exercise of its function as
intermediary. Banks handle a very large number of
transactions because, in the context of relationships between
companies and private and public households, it is
exceedingly rare that the tensions between income and
expenditure, and hence between opportunity and risk, trust
and mistrust, and opportunism and inopportunism, can be
brought into equilibrium in respect of a given period. Risk
situations and situations where information is unequally
distributed are commonplace. This is why the success of
banks in e-commerce will crucially depend on whether they
can offer a higher quality of products and services with lower
transaction costs than other financial service providers.
III. T RUST AS A FACTOR IN
TRANSACTION RELATIONSHIPS
Trust is a ubiquitous feature in the life of transactors, and one
that is essential to all forms and types of transaction [12].
Particularly in the context of winning new customers and
cementing customer loyalty, as well as in the maintenance of
interactive relationships characterised by pronounced
information asymmetries, trust is an extremely important
economic factor [13].
In the first place, trust is a necessary precondition to
overcoming temporal, spatial and preference-based
differences (all of which are typical of e-commerce): trust
enables business decisions to be made in situations of
uncertainty [14]. To put it another way: where there is no
trust between parties seeking to deal with one another, it is
very probable that a trade will not come to fruition, especially
if the transaction partners are unknown to each other [15].
At the same time, however, the evolutionary nature of trust
means that is always susceptible to abuse. Such abuse in turn
erodes trust. Contrary to the thesis (broadly advocated in
scientific discussions) that trust is merely a transient
phenomenon, it can therefore be concluded that trust – even
in situations where modern technologies are used – must be
viewed as an iterative, assimilative process whose historic
development will experience highs, lows and turning points
[16]. The greater the use of innovative – i.e. as yet unfamiliar
– technologies, the more important trust becomes.
Trust develops when individuals (have to) rely on statements
by experts, for example, and are themselves unable to verify
the conclusions drawn. In this situation, the role played by the
organs of state is of paramount importance. For instance,
studies indicate a positive correlation between the perceived
benefit of genetic engineering and the level of confidence in
the legislative regulation of this discipline, and vice versa
[17]. Nevertheless, the same example also implies that such
confidence is based primarily on evolutionary trust – trust in
government institutions and legislation – and is subsequently
transferred onto innovative technologies (in this case, genetic
engineering). Trust in a service can thus be upheld by
appropriate barriers to entry, such as government legislation.
One example is the the German Digital Signatures Act
(SigG).
The other side of the "perceived benefit" coin is that trust –
the assimilation, storage and retrieval of empirical knowledge
– can only be nurtured at an (opportunity) cost: capacity must
be invested to this end which could have been put to
alternative uses [18]. This is why it makes economic sense to
establish instances of trust that are involved in transactions
and are on hand to assist the players on the Web.
Accordingly, such neutral, trustworthy instances must
command twofold trust:
(1)  They must be trusted by the originating supplier, in order
to be able to conduct successful evaluations;
(2)  and they must serve as a "trusted third party" (TTP) to
customers in order to secure the confidence of the latter.
Satisfying the former requirement has a spill-over effect on
the latter: Where a TTP is licensed or accredited by a
certified public watchdog organisation, this very fact both
documents and communicates quality (in the sense used in
security concepts) to the end customer, who is thus in a
position to distinguish between different quality levels and,
ultimately, to exercise trust.
Given the necessary dimension of trust and the fact that
bank/client relationships are one of the few such relationships
that have evolved in the course of history, this paper
postulates that the banks, of all players, are ideally placed to
engender trust between the various players on open electronic
marketplaces. Moreover, this paper further asserts that,
precisely because of this situation, the market imperfections
discussed above have recently opened up a new opportunity
for banks to play a leading role in the economy in the position
of trust mediaries, and thereby to ward off the threat of
disintermediation.
A key aspect in this process is the modified role of the banks.
Their historic origins led them to focus on preparing
transactions, seeking out lenders and borrowers and executing
capital transactions on their behalf. By contrast, in the
electronic marketplace, they will rather play a monitoring and
screening role, accompanying transaction partners through
their dealings with one another (figure 2).
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Figure 2: The modified role of the banks
This development can be attributed to the attenuated
transaction costs for the actual transaction partners resulting
from the use of information and communication technologies.
These costs are far lower than in physical markets, such that
the intermediary bank has no room to create significant added
value through its "agency" function alone. On the other hand,
the potential benefit of intermediate structures to the
transaction partners is now enhanced owing to the
imperfections of electronic marketplaces identified earlier:
the banks can now "accompany" transactions, i.e. by covering
the risks inherent in electronic transactions. Hence, the core
function of banks will be to bring the historic relationship
between bank and customer and the trust that has evolved
over time to bear on the interactive relationship between the
actual transaction partners in the form of applications and
services to accompany their transactions.
IV.  E MPIRICAL FINDINGS
A. Motivation for and structure of empirical studies
To test the hypotheses formulated above, two empirical
studies on the subject of security and trust in e-commerce
were conducted in 1998 and 1999 with the support of
Commerzbank AG, Infratest Burke and the Institute for
Computer Science and Social Studies (IIG) [19]. These
empirical studies were motivated by the need for an in-depth
analysis of those factors which affect the concepts of security
and trust in the context of the Internet. The overriding goal
was to furnish empirical validation for the hypothesis that
"banks are the bearers of trust in e-commerce", based on the
assumption that a Public Key Infrastructure could be a first
technical step towards this function. Further it was a goal to
document bank´s position in the arena of e-commerce.
Furthermore, the studies aimed to identify demand for such
bearers of trust from the perspective of private individuals,
and to outline the market potential for trusted third parties,
encryption technologies, based on digital signatures and
certificates and their respective fields of application. An
additional objective was to reveal background variables and
correlations, and also to simulate specific market scenarios.
An analysis of previous empirical studies in relation to
electronic commerce found that the questioning techniques
used made it impossible to eliminate the problem of social
desirability. As a rule, this mode of questioning precludes
satisfactory conclusions about the genuine preferences of
respondents. The need is instead for a comprehensive
catalogue of questions which embraces a variety of
interrogative techniques [20], [21], [22]: a decompositional
approach to questions about marketing policy in relation to
technology design is absolutely indispensable. This paper can
therefore be seen as an attempt to record and evaluate
preferences with regard to security technologies for digital
networks on the compositional, multidimensional and
decompositional levels. Trust, and the need of Internet users
for security in electronic networks, formed the central focus
of these studies.
The research method used for the first of the two studies was
a one-off, primary-source survey in the form of an
anonymous "classroom questionnaire" filled in by 220
selected retail customers and customers of high net worth at
Commerzbank AG. Having the questionnaires filled in under
supervision combined the benefits of written and oral
questioning techniques and permitted a quantitative
representation of more complex questions. The standardised
survey was made up of two parts: a compositional part based
on a written questionnaire; and a decompositional (conjoint
analysis) part based on the use of 18 stimulus cards. The
overall survey comprised 493 questions. The use of the "limit
conjoint" analysis technique also enabled conclusions to be
drawn about the size of the market for certificate-based
services as a indicator of demand. The idea of using a “limit
conjoint analysis” [23] in the context of e-commerce was
born at the Institut für Informatik und Gesellschaft and was
used in a former research project [24], to show the demand of
intermediation in security-services [25], [26].
The results of this study (which should be confirmed by a
more diversified panel) were fed into a further study to be
presented to an extended random sample (representative for
Germany and involving 1016 people). The objective of this
second study was to provide a more in-depth analysis of
concrete products and applications in the area of certificate-
based services: The focus was on specific application clusters
(e.g. e-mail, online-banking, online-shopping, online-
auctions, local citizen services etc.), within the certificates
could be used and on the prices that respondents would be
willing to pay for trust-solutions. Here again, a conjoint
analysis was performed to enable conclusions to be drawn
about specific strategy and product options and to permit
product simulations.
Whereas the first of the studies had centred primarily around
the issues of sensitivity to market imperfections and the
security needs, knowledge and general willingness of
respondents to buy, the second study sought to lend a more
concrete form to the results of its predecessor, translating
generic results into practical scenarios and to confirm the
generic results.
B. Selected empirical findings
Conducted on two levels, this research identified both
considerable ignorance and a pronounced aversion to risk in
relation to technology-assisted forms of transactions
(especially payment transactions), particularly among less
technologically inclined people. At the same time, a level of
trust (presumably based on the reputation of the transaction
partner and ignoring the transaction medium) that can only be
categorised as "blind faith" was apparent, a finding which
proved that respondents were indeed "out of their depth" in
the context of dynamic systems [27], and which, surprisingly,
occurred irrespective of the respondents' familiarity or
otherwise with the use of innovative digital media. Despite
these results, there was a clearly discernible trend – with
regard both to transactions already conducted over the
Internet and to the respondents' preferences – toward products
and services which fall into the category of commodities and
goods on approval. These results are equivalent to the fact
that people strive for security and uncertainty in the same
way [28]. Likewise there is a discrepancy between the means
of payment used and the preferred means of payment – a
clear indication that goods-for-cash transactions like a money
transfer or writing a check (postpaid after receiving the
goods) are far preferred to digital systems (such as cybercash
or e-cash), where the initializing of the payment-transaction
happens before the delivery of the (physical) goods.
At the same time, the threat of fraud, opportunistic behaviour
and inadequate data integrity was rated as high across the
board; and the need was expressed for instruments and
institutions to lower the cost of transactions, to "simplify" the
transaction process itself (e.g. transfer speeds, Internet
payment systems, agents) and to raise the user's subjective
sense of security (trusted third parties, encryption
technologies). As a general statement, greater importance is
attached in comparative analyses to security-related factors
(e.g. confidentiality, integrity) than to economic factors (e.g.
transaction costs, availability). One result of a simulated
transaction (signing a contract via e-mail) is that the demand
for trust centres and the likelihood of unsigned and
unencrypted contracts being concluded over the Internet (e.g.
by e-mail) can be correlated in part to the individual's
personal disposition of risk, which consists of the factors
control and risk inclination [29].
The following factors and characteristics can be identified as
critical factors of success for a trusted third party:
- Supplier's trustworthiness and reputation
- Supplier's discretion
- Possibility of applying “physical sanctions” in  a face-to-
face dialog
- Range of banking services on offer
- Internet service providing
- Decentralised service and branch network
Both from a descriptive and from a structural point of view, it
was possible to confirm the hypothesis that banks (of all the
potential providers of trust centre services) enjoy the greatest
trust and are at once most preferred and best suited to fulfil
this role. This is due to a variety of factors, of which two in
particular stand out: trustworthiness and discretion. The study
did not permit a definitive interpretation of the causative
reasons for this trust; further research work would be needed
on this issue. Notwithstanding, the respondents evidence a
substantial affinity to the position occupied by the banks and
state institutions, a fact which fundamentally sets them apart
from other potential trust centres (figure 3). 1  An definitive
interpretation of the dimensions in figure 3 is not possible
[22], but nevertheless you can see a “geographical” distance
between the group Telcos/ Others and Bank/ Government .
                                                    
1  As  potential trust centres were considered: Telcos = Telecommunication
Companies; Banks, Governmental Institutions, Technocos = Companies of
the Technological Sector (e.g. Siemens, Microsoft, IBM) and Others =
Companies which are licenced by a authorized trust centre.
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Figure 3: Confidence in potential trusted third parties in the
perception of the respondents
Furthermore, the analyses show that the question of liability
(in case of technical bugs and/ or fraud in result of loss or
theft) is the most elementary and important product
characteristics for the product “certificate”, but that
considerable weight is also attached to the issue of the
suppliers and their reputation – over and above the
significance of price in relation to such services. In this
context, the importance of banking applications as
complementary products and the need for means of applying
physical and personal contact – in the form of personal
contact with the staff of a decentralised branch office
structure – also came to light. Similarly, it became apparent
that, in the first case study, the volume of effective market
demand is influenced predominantly by the way in which
liability is regulated and by complementary products.
With regard to the issue of certificates, the market
simulations performed on the basis of the conjoint analysis
gave banks and public institutions a considerable competitive
edge (cf. figure 4). Given their core functions and the marked
sensitivity of respondents to the issue of liability and to
banking applications, the banks also enjoy a strategic
advantage.
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Figure 4: Market simulations and market size for certificates
and alternative product packages 2
In view of this situation, the willingness of customers to pay a
surprisingly high price for elements of a – the SigG
considering - public key infrastructure (PKI) in the form of
chipcard readers ( ø = 81 DEM) and chipcards ( ø = 42 DEM
                                                    
2  For the definition of the scenarios see appendix.
annual fee). At the same time, banks meet with greater
acceptance the greater the personal value of the transactions
in which certificates are used and the higher the average price
level of smart cards and smart card readers. This trend is
probably attributable not least to the signal impact of price
and to the reputation of the institutes.
In general terms, the segmentation of benefits enabled clearly
delimited target groups to be identified for different potential
TTPs. These target groups can be addressed both on the basis
of price and with regard to the range of applications for
certificates – and, by association, based on the requisite
partners. The data material used provides an initial indication
that the banks will still be able to assert themselves on the
market despite higher prices. Telecommunications and
technology providers, on the other hand, are more attractive
to the price-sensitive segment of the market. Even here,
however, they will only be able to corner a significant share
of the market if suitable certificate-based services are
provided. Besides certificates, the following factors can also
be seen to have an influence on demand: the value of
transactions; the purported potential for reducing transaction
costs; the confidentiality of communications; the option of
personalising and tracing transactions; and convenience. An
analysis of the preferred services, where citizens could use
certificates, – both from a descriptive and from a structural
perspective – reveals a trend toward services of a high-value,
personalised and convenient nature should they be offered
over the Web: Major preferences centre around municipal
services (e.g. requesting a new passport), wealth-creation
programmes (e.g. brokerage and banking) and intracompany
authorisation and authentication mechanisms (e.g. giving
somebody power of attorney). By contrast, the encryption and
signing of private e-mails does not constitute a market for
smart card based certificates.
The analysis of the banking industry indicates that offering
trust centre services would indeed be a useful means of
attracting new customers and securing their loyalty. There is
also a noticeable trend in favour of privately-owned large
banks; the Deutsche Bank brand achieved the highest scores.
The benefit segmentation revealed by a (conjoint) analysis of
preferences nevertheless found that those institutions in
particular that have traditionally been seen as "second banks"
(Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank) harbour considerable
potential for cementing customer loyalty and that, for this
reason, it would be advisable for precisely these institutions
to position themselves strategically.
Based on these findings, the multitude of variables can be
narrowed down to three key factors which argue in favour of
the banks as the bearers of trust in a digital economy and
which, hence, can be identified as "critical factors of
success". These same factors also represent the starting point
for strategic considerations concerning the future role of
banks in the electronic marketplace.
V.  C ONCLUSION : T RUST MEDIATION AS A CONCEPT
FOR DIGITAL BUSINESS
Even against the background of these empirical results, the
core functionality of a bank – as an intermediary which
reduces transactional complexity – coupled with the insights
gained from recent institutional economics regarding
intermediation and disintermediation shows that banks (as
well as public institutions) have the wherewithal to diminish
the complexities which currently confront users in the arena
of e-commerce. At the same time, the transformation
functions that the banks have performed to date give them a
competitive advantage over public institutions – and leverage
to match.
In view of the technical feasibility of providing trust
functions based on digital certificates and a public key
infrastructure (PKI) in an online context, banks already have
the option of positioning themselves as trust mediaries (i.e. as
process entities interposed between the supply and demand
sides in order to foster and transform the trust needed for
transactions and to provide services which reduce the cost of
transactions) thanks to their existing customer base and the
leadership and control functions inherent in the nature of
corporate customer business [30]. In order to survive in the
digital world, this kind of trust mediary must far surpass the
efficiency of other (financial) intermediaries. As far as
electronic commerce is concerned, this implies the need to
exploit economies of scale and synergistic benefits to the full
when evaluating the transaction partners involved, in addition
to a need for high-quality monitoring. It follows that the
future role of a bank need not consist of offering e-commerce
because other institutions are doing likewise, nor because of
the threat posed by non-banks and near-banks. Instead, the
banks should be taking what they already "produce"
successfully in the real world and transferring it to the virtual
world. The role of the banks in e-commerce can thus be
defined in the following points:
- "Enabling business" by exercising transformation
functions
- Preparing their clients for the digital economy and
thereby safeguarding their own business base
- Distributing "enabling technologies" which diminish
risks,  such as certificates and PKIs
- Reducing transaction costs across all phases of market
transactions
- Cultivating trust in a world of perceived "uncertainty".
The banks' existing strategies for e-commerce, which were
originally designed to combat disintermediation, are merely
delaying the process that will ultimately erode their business
base; they offer genuine solutions neither to the problems of
electronic commerce nor to the threat of disintermediation.
Success in e-commerce will be enjoyed by those institutions
who define an electronic business strategy that is function-
oriented rather than product-oriented. The focus must be on
three complementary functions. A bank cannot position itself
as a trust mediary unless it satisfies all the functions
illustrated in what is defined as the “T 3  model” (figure 5)
with consistently high quality: it must offer transformation
functions, provide transaction cost reductions to the
originating parties and command the trust of the same. Only
then will the bank be able to defend itself successfully and
over the long term against spread of alternative suppliers.
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Figure 5: The concept of trust mediation
From a strategic point of view, e-commerce therefore
requires the banks to think back to their primary functions:
not as a "one-size-fits-all" modern service provider, but
starting from the origins of the banking industry and from
developments in industry around the turn of the century. On
this basis, a functional service can then be developed whose
content and function will, in all probability, largely resemble
traditional banking business: the transformation of trust,
maturities and risks. Sure: there is a kind of chicken-and-egg
problem, because the transaction partners need matching
technologies and codes. But banks with their inter-bank
relationship and the evolutionary bank-customer relationship
should have a large potential to penetrate this market. Despite
all the technological advances, the laws of economics and
their implications ultimately remain unchanged. Tomorrow's
banks will be obliged to assume (core) functions that can be
subsumed under the heading of "trust mediation". Ideally,
their position as "trust mediaries" will offer the market
something that rarely ever exists in practice: a genuine "win-
win" situation for the originating transaction partners and the
intermediaries alike.
A PPENDIX
Scenario 1:
Banks Government Telcos
Annual fee 30 DEM 30 DEM 30 DEM
Liability of... Customer Customer Customer
Integrated
Payment System?
No No No
Note: In the following scenarios the features, written in bold  italic  letters, are
the changed features in contrast to the scenario before – the other features are
static.
Scenario 2:
Liability of... Until 100
DEM
claim:
Customer
3
Until 100
DEM claim:
Customer
Until 100
DEM claim:
Customer
Scenario 3:
Annual fee 60 DEM 30 DEM 30 DEM
Scenario 4:
Integrated
Payment System?
Yes No No
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